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Abs  trac t
This  s  tudy  assesses  r,zhether regulatory  actions  account  for  rnaj  or  changes
in  estimates  of  inpottant  housing  coefficients  since  the  late-1970s.  Results
inply  that  the  bulk  of  these  changes  owe to  the  end  of  Reg Q and  that  Reg Q
measures need  to  account  for  the  introduction  of  deposit  instruments  in  the
Iate-1970s.  Findings  inply  that  rnodels of  the  aggregate  housing  stock  are
unlikely  to  yield  coefficients  that  are  stable  enough for  practical  use  unless
they  accurately  control  for  regulatory  changes.  In  this  xegatd,  accounting
for  small  saver  or  money market  certificates  yields  significant  improvements
over  a naive  Reg Q roeasure.
'l  would  like  to  thank,  without  implicating,  Jean  Zhang,  Jeremy  Nalewaik,  and
and  Anne  King  for  providing  research  assistance;  Dave  Reifschneider  for
discussions  about  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  quarterly  model;  and Michael
Boldin,  John  (Jack)  Goodman  and John  Roberts  for  helpful  suggestions.  The
views  expressed  are  those  of  the  author  and  do  not  necessarily  feflect  those
of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  the  FederaL  Reserve
Bank  of  Dallas,  or  any  other  staff  in  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  Any
remaining  errors  are  my owrl,I.  Introduction
A  nurnber  of  studies  have  argued  that  the  impact  of  real  interest  rates
on  economic  activity  has  changed  because  of  financial  innovation  and
deregulation.  This  concern  is  particularly  relevant  to  housing  given  the
large  institlutional'ehanges  in  nortgage  finance,  the  sensitivity  of  housing  to
interest  rates,  deposit  deregulation,  and  the  important  role  of  housing  in
U.S.  business  cycles  Ie.g.,  Gordon (1988)]  and the  transnission  of  nonetary
poLicy  Ie.g.,  Bosworth  (1989)  and Mauskopf (f990)].
This  study  investigates  whether  and  to  what  extent  changes  in  deposit
regulations  (Reg  Q)  account  for  changes  in  estimates  of  key  housing  paraneters
since  the  1970s.  Although  Reg Q ceilings  were  lifted  over  a  decade  ago,  its
impact  on  estimated  housing  coefficients  is  scill  with  us  because  the  post-Reg
Q era  is  relatively  short  frorn  a  time  series  perspective.  With  the  first
passing  of  a  post-Reg  Q business  (and  interest  rate)  cycle,  enpirical  analysis
of  this  issue  is  nov/ nore  feasible.  In  addition,  while  the  behavior  of
housing  has  always  been  important  to  industry  analysts,  its  importance  to
policy  makers  has  risen  of  late  since  the  Federal  Reserve  (L993)  deernphasized
M2 and  put  nole  stress  on  real  interest  rates  as  economic  indicators,l
In  assessing  the  impact  of  Reg Q on  eslimated  housing  coefficients,  this
study  proceeds  as  fo11ows.  The next  section  clarifies  hovr this  study's  Reg Q
measures  irnprove  upon  those  in  prior  studies.  Then,  the  baseline  housing
modeL and  the  data  are  described.  Thereafter,  estimation  results  are
presented  and  the  conclusion  discusses  the  irnplications  of  these  findings.
'  The Fed alters  shorL-term  rates  in  light  of  GDP  forecasts  based  partly
on estimates  of  the  effects  of  long-term  real  rates  on housing.  Typical
objections  to  using  real  rates  as  Fed policy  guides  include  that  financial
innovations  and deregulation  have  altered  the  rate  sensitivity  of  GDP,
measuring  expected  inflation  is  difficult,  the  rate  sensitivity  of  investment
waries  over  the  business  cycle,  and monetary  policy  regines  affect  observed
rate  elasticities.  This  study  sheds light  on the  first  of  these concerns.2
IL  Previous Work on Reg Q Effects  on llous  ing
Several  studies  have  argued  that  the  inpact  of  interest  rates  on housing
has been  altered  and reduced  by  deposit  deregulation,  the  advent  of  adjustable
rate  nortgage.s  (ARMs), and. the  development  of  the  mortgage-backed  securities
market Ie.9.,  Bosh'orth  (1989), Brueckner  and FoLlain (1989), Kahn (1989),
Pozdena (1990),  Ryding  (1990),  and Throop (1986)1.  The larger  impact of
interest  rates  before  the  1,980s  has been attributed  to  dis intermediation;  it
has been  argued  that  mortgages  had been ratioued  more r^rith non-price  tefins  by
depositories  when households  shifted  out  of  deposits  because narket  interest
rates  rose  above deposit  rate  ceilings  Ie.g.,  Jaffee  and Rosen (L978,  1979),
Mauskopf  (1990), Pozdena  (1990), Ryding (1990), and Throop (1986)1.,
Not  controlling  for  this  structural  change has  three  najor  irnplications
for  housing  equations.  First,  the  observed interest  elasticity  of  housing has
fallen  since  deregulation,  implying  chac  full  sarnple estination  will  yield  a
rate  elasticity  that  is  too  low  for  the  pre-deregulation  period  and  too  high
for  the  pos  t-deregulation  period.  Seeond,  giwen  the  role  of  finance  in
housing,  onitted  wariable  bias  nay  affecc  other  coefficienus  in  such models.
Third,  given  that  mos! househoLd deposit  rates  were  deregulated  in  the  early-
1-980s,  this  oxniuted  variable  bias  is  likely  to  cause paraneter  instability.
Each of  these  implications  is  borne  out  by  the  Federal  Reserwe Board
' 
In  a  post-Reg  Q era,  mortgages  nay  be  partially  rationed  with  nonprice
terms,  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Duca and Rosenthal  (1991),  because  of
adverse  selection/moral  hazard  effects  [Jaffee  and Russell  (1976)  and  Stiglitz
and  Weiss  (1981)]  and  because  lenders  face  deadweight  costs  of  default
IWillianson  (1986)].  Rosenthal  ,  Duca,  and  Gabriel  (1991)  find  that  the
interest  sensitivity  of  housing  is  boosted  by  rnortgage-pa)ruent-to-  incone
ratios  which  are  nore  likely  to  be  binding  as  mortgage  pa]rments  rise  with
mortgage  rates.  Thus,  lifting  Reg Q has  likely  reduced,  but  not  eliminated,
the  effect  of  nonprice  terns  on  the  observed  interest  sensitivity  of  housing.staff's  nodel  ("FRB rnodel")  of  the  growth  rate  of  the  real  U.S.  housing  stock.
Flrst,  if  one  drops  the  dunny  variable  for  dis  intermediation  in  the  FRB rnodel,
the  long-run  real  rate  elasticity  of  housing  drops  by  189  as  the  end  of  sample
is  extended  frorn  1979:Q4  to  L992:Q4.  Second,  estimated  coeffici.ents  of  key
variables  differ  greatly  when  a  better  Reg  Q neasure  and  a  drunmy for  the
credit  controls  of  1980:Q2  are  added  to  this  roodel.  Third,  these  parameter
estimates  mowe much  less  over  tine  when  the  FRB nrodel  is  altered  in  this  way.
Three  approaches  have  been  used  to  control  for  dis intermediation.  The
first  and  seminal  approaeh  adds  deposit  outflows  at  thrifts  as  an  independent
variable  to  housing  regressions  Isee  Hendershott  (1980)  and Jaffee  and  Rosen
(1978,  1979)1.  With  respect  to  identifying  the  nonReg Q interest  sensitivity
of  housing,  a  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  that  deposit  outflows  reflect
not  only  dis  interroediation  induced  by  Reg  Q,  but  also  the  impact  of  interest
rates  and  declining  income  on  money  demand.r  In  addition,  using  a  thrift
deposit  variable  is  probLeroatic  in  samples  including  the  late-1980s  and  early-
1990s  because  of  the  shrinkage  of  the  thrift  industry.  Finally,  such  deposit
flow  variables  are  sometines  marginally  significant,  as  in  Jaffee  and  Rosen
(1979),  though  Hendershott  (1980)  finds  then  to  be  significant  with  an  implied
inpact  that  is  half  the  size  irnplied  by  the  Jaffee  and  Rosen  estinates.
A  second  approach  to  handling  Reg  Q effects  is  to  separate  out  periods
of  credit  rationing  when estinating  the  interest  sensitivity  of  housing.  This
strategy,  as  employed  in  o1d  versions  of  the  MPS nodel  [Brayton  and  Mauskopf
(1"985)],  has  two  drawbacks.  First,  it  Chrows  out  nuch  of  the  sample  when
interest  rates  rose  sharply,  thereby  limiting  our  ability  to  identify  the
3 l,loney  demand  still  falls  in  the  short-run  when  interest  rates  rise
because  deposit  rates  adjust  sluggishly  Isee  Moore,  Porter,  and  SrnaLl (1990)]4
nonReg Q interest  sensitivity  of  housing.  Second,  after  periods  of  disinter-
nediation,  large  deposit  inflows  accompanied  declining  interest  rates,  and
housing  starts  tended  to  surge  as  pent-up  demands lrere  met.  Rather  than  durney
out  rate  terms  irl  disinte  nediation  pefiods,  the  current  FRB housing  model
uses  a  non-interactive  durnrny  for  these  periods.  Neveftheless,  the  rate
sensitivity  in  this  nodel  may still  shift  over  time  [Mauskopf  (]-990,  p.  997)1.
A  third  approach  is  to  use  neasures  of  hor^r  binding  Reg  Q ceilings  were
and  thereby  sort  out  the  underl-ying  interest  sensitivity.  These  wariables  are
typically  defined  as  the  difference  between  a  market  rate  and  some deposit
rate  ceiling  vrhen the  ceiling  is  binding,  and  0  otherwise.  However,  studies
indicate  that  estinated  coefficients  on  such  Reg  Q measures  are  unstable  ower
the  roid-L970s  and  the  Late-L97 0s  / early  1980s  [Ryding  (1990)].  This  rnay
reflect  that  sone  partially  deregulated  substitutes  for  srnall  tixfte  deposits
(e.g.,  small  saver  certificates)  were  introduced  in  the  late-1970s  before  rnost
deposit  ceilings  were  lifted  in  1983  [see  Mahoney,  et  al .  (1987)]  and  that  Reg
Q effects  were  cushioned  in  the  late-1970s  by  the  secondary  mortgage  market
and  Federaf  Horne Loan  Bank  Board  (  II{LBB)  advances  to  thrifts.
In  adopting  the  chird  approach  to  handling  Reg  Q,  this  study  adds  Reg  Q
measures  accounting  for  the  introduction  of  new  deposit  instrunents  to  the  FRB
model.  By  doing  so,  this  study  provides  both  explanations  for  and
measurements  of  the  evolution  of  key  housing  coefficients  that  are  based  not
on  loose  references  to  financial  innovations,  but  rather  on  explicit  measures
of  them.  Results  show  that,  by  preventing  substantial  onitted  variable  bias,
the  inclusion  of  a  carefully  measured  Reg  Q variable  can  largely  explains  the
fall  in  the  interest  sensitivity  of  housing  since  the  1970s  and yields
interest  rate  and  permanent  incorne  coefficients  that  are  relatively  stable.5
III.  The Basellne  llous  ing  Speclfication
The housing  specificauion  used  in  this  s  tudy  is  the  FRB error  correction
model  of  the  gro\rth  rate  of  the  real  stock  of  residential  housing  (single-  and
multi-fanily)..-  The long-run  determinants  of  the  stock  (IlS)  are  the  one
quarter  lags  of  the  real  user  cost  of  capital  for  housing  (R!)  and the  log  of
a permanent  incorne proxy  (dON).  These three  variables  hawe a unit  root  and
are  cointegrated.  The short-run  determinants  are  a  dunny  for  credit  rationing
induced  by  dis internediation  at  S&Ls in  the  1950s and early-1970s  (DdR) and
the  one-  and  two-quarter  lags  of  the  growth  rate  of  resldential  construcEion.
More formally,  the  FRB  model  is:
A[log(Ils)].  :  p. -  p,Log(Iis).-,  + B,log(.R]).,  + B,log(col.t).-,
+ B.A  llog (lls)  lr-r + ps^llog(fis)1"_?  + B,A[1og(R])lt  + PpcR., (r)
where  Bo is  a  constant,  A  denotes  the  first  difference  operator,  and  the  long-
run  and  short-run  coefficients  are  estlmated  in  a  single  stage.
Because  the  model  is  a  one-stage  error-correction  nodel  that  jointly
estimates  long-run  and  short-run  relationships,  it  includes  the  one-quarter
lags  of  the  logs  of  the  income,  interest  rate,  and  housing  stock  variables
instead  of  an  error-correction  term  that  would  be  estinated  in  an  initial
first  stage,  For  our  purposes,  it  is  advantageous  to  use  a  one-stage  approach
because  it  directly  shows  hor,r properly  controlling  for  regulation  can  lead  to
different  estlmates  of  long-run  relationships.  In  other  regression  runs,  a
two-stage  approach  was  used,  where  long-run  cointegrating  relationships  were
estimated  in  a  first  stage  and  were  chen  added  to  a  second  stage  housing
regression  which  dropped  the  variables  log(l/S),_,,  Iog(Ri)"_,,  and  log(CON)._,
frorn  equation  (1).  Where comparable,  qualitauive  results  were  similar  to  one-6
stage  estimation  findings  presented  later  in  lhe  cext  and the  tables."
IV,  Data  and Varlables
The variables  used  fall  into  three  categories:  (a)  user  cost  of
capital,  (b)  income,  and  (c)  Reg Q/financial  innovation  variables.
The  Real  User  Cost  of  Capitaf  for  Housing
The  user  cos!  of  capital  (R")  is  the  product  of  the  relatiwe  price  of
housing  (P'/P')  and  the  norninal  effective  mortgage  rate  (R')  adjusted  for  the
marginal  income  tax  rate  (t)  for  a  family  of  four  earning  the  median  level  of
incorne  (Treasury  data),  the  average  property  tax  rate  (tp),  and  the  four-year
moving  average  annualized  percent  change  in  rnedian  existing  horne prices  (rh"):
P  *  Qr/P")  [(1-r)(R.+rp) + 2.4 -  nh"], (2>
lvhere  P'  :  the  price  index  for  new  housing,  ?"  :  the  implicit  price  deflator
for  personal  consunption  expenditures,  and  2.4  reflects  depreciatlon.  For  a
discussion  of  this  and  other  FRB nodel  variables,  see  Brayton  and  Mauskopf
(1985)  as  many  variables  they  describe  are  used  in  the  current  FRB rnodel.
Income  Var iabTes
Real  perrnanent  income  (Yp)  is  proxled  by  real  spending  on  consumer
nondurabLes  and  services  plus  the  real  imputed  floru  of  services  from  the  stock
of  consumer  durable  goods  (dOrV).  This  proxy  embodies  the  nouion  that
consunption  is  based  on  household  perceptions  of  permanent  income  and  awoids
-Specifically, 
as the  end-of-sample was extended from 1979 to  L993,
second-stage estimates  of  coefficients  on the  error-correction  and Ret Q terns
changed much less  when the  one-quarter  lag  of  REGQSSC  or  REGQMMC  replaced  DCR.
This  parallels  one-stage  estimation  results  presented  later  that  show holt
coefficients  on long-run  variables  (log(Rh),  log(CON), and log  (HS)) and on
short-run  Reg Q terms  are  more stable  when REGQSSC  or  REGQMMC  replacad  DCR.
An appendix  available  frorn  the  author  provides  two-stage  results.I
two  types  of  problems  posed by  creating  a permanent  income proxy  based  on past
disposable  incorne.  The first  is  associated  with  the  lnplicit  use of  adaptive
expectations  of  income.  The second stems  from  the  difficulty  of  identifying
the  short-run  effects  of  changes in  permanent  incoroe [A(log(Ye))"]  when the
underlying  disposable  income data  are  affected  by  tenporary  changes  in  taxes,
subsidies,  or  other  federal  transfers  lasting  more than  one quarter,
Reg Q/Financial  Innovation  VariabTes .
Several  regulatory  variables  were tested,  including  measures of  Reg Q,
the  FRB  model's  Reg Q dumrny,  and a  dunmy for  the  credit  controls  of  1980:Q2.
Reg Q Spreads.  Three  Reg Q variables  were based  on  spreads  be!\reen narket
rates  and deposit  rate  ceilings,  which raises  three  issues:  (1)  which retaiL
deposit  rate  to  use,  (2)  whether rate  ceilings  for  thrifts  or  banks should be
used,  and  (3)  how to  handle  the  introduction  of  market-rate  based  deposits
prior  to  the  lifting  of  rate  ceilings  on nontransactions  deposits  in  1983.
With  respect  to  issue  (1),  the  Reg Q spreads reflected  regulations
affecting  smal]  tirne deposits  for  two reasons.  First,  srnall time  deposits
have  rnaturities  closer  to  that  of  mortgages  than  those  of  dernand  or  passbook
savings  deposits.  Second, most market-based deposits  that  were introduced  in
the  late-1970s  were,  by  design,  substitutes  for  smal1 tirne deposits.
In  handling  issue  (2),  rate  ceilings  on thrifts  were used.  Thrifts  were
nuch nore  important  home morEgage lenders  owing  to  tax  incentiwes  that
encouraged  thrifts  to  hold  mortgages  and because  rate  ceilings  on  chrift
accounts  were  as high  or  if  not  higher  than  those  on bank  deposits.
In  handling  issue  (3),  there  were two basic  types  of  partially  regulated
deposits  that  rdere introduced  before  1983 by  lar-r:  smalf-saver  certificates
(SSCs) and money  market certificates  (MMCs).  Using SSC  reguLations  too
construct  a  Reg  Q variable  is  preferable  on  two  grounds.  First,  the  maturity
of  SSCS (2  xo  4  years)  was  more  relevant  for  funding  mortEages  than  that  of
MMCs (6-months).  Second,  the  rninirnurn balance  requireuents  on  SSCs  ($500-
$1,000)  were  much more  similar  to  those  on  retail  deposits  than  were  the
requirements  on Ml,lCs  ($10,000)  over  the  late-1970s  and  early-l980s.  This
Latter  factor  made  SSCS more  substitutable  for  small  tirne  deposits.
On the  other  hand,  because  they  lacked  rate  ceilings,  Ml.l0s had  an
advantage  over  SSCs.  In  addition,  different  minimum  balance  requireuents  nay
not  have  nade  SSCs substantially  more  effectiwe  in  reducing  dis  interrnediation
than  MMCs for  two  reasons.  First,  the  minimum  balance  requirenent  on  MMCS
equaLed  the  minirnum  size  of  Treasury  securities  in  the  late-1970s  and  earLy
1980s,  and  Treasuries  were  the  main  conpeting  financial  asset  for  retail-
deposits.  Second,  because  they  were  federally-insured,  MMCs allowed  many
thrifts  and  small-  to  mid-size  banks  to  issue  a  nontraded  substitute  for
uninsured  large  time  deposits.  Since  this  market  was  not  very  deep  at  the
time,  nany  depositories  were  not  effectively  abLe  to  issue  large  tine  deposits
until  the  rnid-1980s.  Because  mortgage  narkets  had  been  dorninated  by  such
institutions  up  through  the  mid-1980s,  MMCs  enabled  rnany thrifts  and  nonmoney
center  banks  to  raise  loanable  funds  when  Reg  Q was  binding  in  the  late-1970s
and  early  1980s.  Thus,  the  advent  of  MMCs, rather  than  of  SSCs,  rnay have
ended  Reg  Q-induced  dis  internediat  ion.  Therefore,  it  is  an  empirical  issue
whether  Reg Q effects  rnore closely  reflected  regulations  on MMCS  or  on  SSCS.
Given  these  considerations,  three  Reg  Q measures  were  defined  using
spreads  between  narket  interest  rates  and  snall  time  deposit  and/or  SSC rate
ceilings.  One  (RE6QU) equaled  the  quarterly  average  spread  between  the  three-
year  Treasury  rate  and  the  rate  ceiling  on  three-year  small  tine  deposits  whenthe  ceiling  \^ras  binding,  and 0 otherwise.  In  May 1982, ceilings  on 2-1/2  to
3-L/2  year  small  tine  deposits  were lifted.  This  measure i-s sinilar  to  that
of  Ryding  (1990)  and serves  as  a benchmark for  comparing  the  performance  of
nore  detailed  Reg Q measures.  The second Reg Q variabLe  (REGQSSd)  equals
REGQU  before  L979:Q3.  Starting  in  1979:Q3  when SSCS  were created,  REGQSSC
equals  one of  the  folloi,ring  based  on quarter  averages  of  monthly  data:  (a)
any  legislated  spread  between rnarket  interest  rates  and SSC  rates  (0  to  50
basis  points  in  certain  quarters),  (b)  the  rnaximum  of  0  and  the  2-L/2  year
Treasury  yield  (constant  naturity)  minus  any  legislated  cap on  SSC  rates,  or
(c)  0  since  August  1981 rrhen rate  ceilings  on  SSCs  r,rere removed.s  The third
Reg Q warlable  (REGQII|IC)  equals  REGQLI  until  1978:Q2 and 0  thereafter  on
grounds  that  MMCS  did  not  have  any  rate  ceilings  on  them.  For  detaifs  on
deposit  regulations,  see Mahoney, et  a1.  (1987).  Accounting  for  SSCs  results
in  a Reg Q variable  that  is  srnaller  over'L919-L981  (see Figure  1).6
1-980  Credit  ControTs.  A dumny  was included  for  the  irnposition  of  credit
'In  January and February 1980, SSC  rates  were set  at  50 basis  points
belor,/ the  2-I/2  year  constant  uaturity  Treasury  yie1d.  In  March and April
1980,  SSC  yieLds  could  be  as high  as  the  maximuln  of  12 percent  a  d  xlne Z-T/2
year  constant  maturity  Treasury  yield  ninus  50 basis  points.  Frorn June  1980
through  July  1981,  SSC  yields  could  equal  rhe  2-'J-/2 year  constant  naturity
Treasury yield  when this  yield  was between 9.5  and 1-2.0  percent,  could  be as
high  as 9.5  percent  rr'hen  this  Treasury  yield  was belorv 9.5  percent,  and could
be as high  as 12.0 percent  when this  Treasury yield  exceeded 12.0 percent.
6 One drawback of  these  measures is  that  they  do not  control  for  the
declining  role  of  deposits  in  funding  mortgages.  The secondary  nortgage
narkets  also  reduced  the  impact  of  Reg Q by  allowing  originators  to  sell
mortgages.  However,  these  markets  \,/ere not  very  well  developed  until  the  nid-
1980s and thus,  may not  have  altered  the  inpact  of  Reg Q effects  much.  In
regressions  not  presented  here,  multiplying  the  Reg Q terms  by  the  shares  of
nortgage  originations  held  by  depositories  did  not  irnprove nodel  fit,  nor  did
nultiplying  Reg Q neasures by  the  liabiLity  share of  retail  deposits  at
thrifts  to  control  for  the  growing  use  of  large  tiue  deposits  which  were  not
















































































controls  (CONTRoL)  in  L980:Q2,  which equaled  1in  L980:Q2.?  Although they
exenpted  household  borrowing,  the  controls  depressed  borrowing  because many
consumers thought  that  it  was illegal  to  borrow  and because nany  lenders
curtailed  all  types  of  loans  in  order  to  meet overall  loan  targets  and  to
linit  their  credit  risk  exposure during  this  depressing  regulatory  episode.
The FW  lTodel's  Credit  Rationing  Du  ny.  The IRB model  includes  a  durnmy  (DdR)
for  credit  rationing  at  S&Ls during  periods  of  Reg Q-induced  dis intermediation
up throuth  the  early-l-970s.  DdR  equals  1 only  in  L956:Q2-Q3, 1969:Q3-1970Q3,
and 1973:Q4-75:Ql.  DdR  does not  control  for  dis intermediation  in  the  late-
1970s and early-1980s  on grounds  that  the  secondary  mortgage  market  was
created  in  the  early-L97os  and that  ceilings  on  large-time  deposit  rates  were
lifted  in  1976.  DCR  also  ignores  that  Reg Q was binding  in  the  early-1960s.
However,  deposit  rate  ceilings  1ikely  induced  dis intermediation  up
through  the  early-lg80s  because  the  mortgage-backed  securities  market  was not
well-deveLoped  nor  thick  until  the  mid-L980s  and because many thrifts  were  not
r,ue  1l-knovm  enough to  issue  uninsured  large-time  deposits.s  An additional
? ReaI  GDP  felL  at  a  annual  rate  of  10C in  1980:e2.  In  a  conment  on
Hendershott  (1980),  Jaffee  (1980,  p.  447)  rernarked  thar,  "the  1980  credit
crunch  would  rank  among the  best..,  albeit  it  ls  sonethlng  of  a  new breed,',
3 The  Lifting  of  ceilings  on  uninsured  large  time  deposits  in  1973 was of
limited  help  in  alleviating  Reg Q effects  for  two  reasons.  First,  back  in  the
1970s,  it  was  difficult  for  srnaller,  Iess  well-kno\^rn  banks  and  thrifts  to
issue  uninsured  large  time  deposits,  Second,  lrhen  rate  ceilings  were  binding
on  insured  deposits,  banks  flooded  the  market  r,rith  uninsured  large  CDs in
periods  when  default  risk  was  high  partly  due  to  monelary  tlghtening.  As  a
result,  the  risk  preniurn  that  investors  denanded  on  large  CDs typically  soared
well  above  the  then  normal  preroium  of  one-half  a  percentage  point  above
Treasury  rates  (e.9.,  when the  funds  rate  peaked  in  July  1974,  six-rnonth  CD
rates  were  4  percentage  points  higher  than  six-nonth  Treasury  rates.  Such
high  CD "prerniuns"  !/ere  passed  on  to  borrowers  ln  the  forns  of  wider  spreads
between  loan  and  Treasury  rates  and  nore  restrictive  credit  standards,  The
lack  of  insurance  on  large  CDs coupled  with  restrictiwe  ceilings  on  insured
deposits  effectively  gave  monetary  tightening  moves  more  of  a  kick.
Note  also  that  brokered  snall  time  deoosits  \uere  not  substantial  untilL1
shortcoming  is  that  this  durnmy  variable  treats  aII  dis interrnediation  periods
as hawing  the  same size  effect  on housing  even  though  the  degree  of  Reg Q
bindingness  differed.  As  a  result,  the  variable  DCR  may not  controf  for  the
bias  that'Reg  Q imposes on estimates  df  the  rate  coefflcients  on houslng
V.  Enpirical  Results
This  section  assesses  the  impact  of  regulatory  changes by  reviewing
regressions  of  FRB  nodel  variants  \rith  and without  regulatory  variables  and
then conparlng  ex post  forecasts  from these modeLs.
Regress  ion  Resul Ds
Sevbral  patterns  arise  from the  regression  results  (table  1).  First,
CONTROL,  RECQU,  REGQSSC,  and REGQLINC  are  significant  with  the  expected  sLgns.
Second,  over  the  longer  sample,  the  regulation-nodi  fied  rnodels have  somewhat
higher  corrected  R''s  than  the  FRB  rnodel  .  Third,  unlike  the  nodels  using
REGQSSC  and REGQ|4|TC,  the  coefficients  of  the  FRB  model  change substantially  as
the  sarnple is  extended beyond 1979;e  the  lagged stock  coefficient  [log(dS) ]
junps  59*,  the  coefficient  on the  FRB Reg Q dunmy (DdR) falls  by  35*,  rhe
coefficient  on the  lagged user  cost  of  capital  [log(Rh)]  rises  94*,  and the
inplied  long-run  interest  elasticity  rises  by  22*.'o
the  mid-1980s.  These instrurents  are  deDosits  marketed  bv  third  Darties  r,yhose
size  plus  expected  interest  pa)nnents rnerl  under  the  naximum limit  cowered by
deposit  Lnsurance.  The raising  of  this  limit  frorn $25,000 to  $100,000 in  1982
coupled  with  perverse  deposit  insurance  incentives  for  bankrupt  thrifts  likely
explains  the  strong  growth  in  such  accounts  after  the  early-1980s.
s NevertheLess,  all  models easily  pass Chov,  tests  on model residuals.  In
a  related  study,  Duca (L995)  finds  that  REGQSSC  is  highly  significant  in
explaining  real  GDP  groqrth and that  without  R'6QSSC, estimates  of  the
elasticity  of  real  GDP  growth  r{ith  respect  to  the  real  federal  funds  rate
change greatLy  as  samples are  extended  beyond  the  early-1980s.
lo .r^  t ^-- Ei-dbticity  of  the  stock  of  housing  equals  the  eoefficient
on  log(Rn).-,  divided  by  the  coefficient  on  log(liS).,,.  Since  lhe  magnitades  ofL2
As shown  in  table  2,  this  particular  qualitatiwe  finding  was al-so
obtained  in  urodels  that  did  not  include  lags  of  the  dependent  variable  or
CONTROL.  Fourth,  unlike  the  regulation-modified  rnodels,  the  lagged  log-level
of  the  user  cost  of  capital  in  the  FRB is  insignificant  using  the  pre-L980
sample.  Fifth,  coefficients  on  the  lagged  stock  (IiS)  and  permanent  incone
(dON)  change  substantially  in  the  presence  of  the  credit  control  durnrny.
Lastly,  REGQSSC and. REGQMI^C  perform  better  than  RESQU on  two  grounds.
First,  their  models  yield  some\rhat  higher  full  sanple  fits.  Second,  unlike
the  case  for  REGQU, coefficients  in  models  using  REGQSSd  and  REGQl4l4d  do  not
change  dramatically  in  size  as  the  end  of  sanple  is  extended  frorn  1979:Q4  to
1993:Q4.  By contrast,  in  lhe  nodels  using  REGQU,  the  estinated  long-run  rate
elasticity  rises  by  34*  and  the  coefficients  on  the  one  quarter  lags  of  the
housing  stock  (fiS),  permanent  income  (dON),  and RSGQU  fall  by  31*,  348,  and
658,  respectively,  as  the  sample  is  extended.ll
ReaI  Rate  ETasticity  and  Coefficient  Results
It  may  seem odd  that  the  absolute  nagnitude  of  the  real  rate  elasticity
from  the  FRB model  increases  rather  than  decreases  as  the  sanple  is  extended
into  t-he  1980s.  However,  it  is  inportant  to  recotnize  that  the  FRB rnodel
the  coefficients  in  the  nunerator  and  denominator  both  rise  as  the  sample  is
changed,  the  percentage  increases  in  the  magnitudes  of  these  coefficients  (949
and  59?,  respectively)  are  blgger  than  that  of  the  elasricity  (22S).  The
Iong-run  rate  eLasticities  are  of  the  stock,  father  than  the  flow  of  housing.
Since  the  housing  stock  is  abour  $5  trillion  ($1987),  esrimated  elasticities
and  stock  adjustment  speeds  irnpl-y  that  a  100t  rise  in  the  real  after-tax
mortgage  rate  will,  ceteris  paribus,  cut  the  total  housint  stock  by  about  $40
billion  in  one year  and  $100 billion  at  the  end  of  three  years;  rhis  is
nontrivial  compared to  annual  residential  construction  of  about  $225 billion.
u  Ryding  (1990)  found  that  the  impact  of  his  Reg  Q neasure  (which  is
sirnilar  to  REGQU)  is  one-third  srnaller  ower  1978-82  than  in  earlier  periods.
In  runs  not  shown  in  the  tabLes,  a  Reg  Q variable  based  on  spreads  between
six-month  Treasury  yields  and  ceilings  on  six-month  small  tine  deposit  races
yielded  results  that  rrere  qualitatively  similar  to  those  obtained  with  REGQU.includes  a  durnrny  variable  (DCR)  for  sone  periods  of  dis  interx0ediation  that
affected  mortgage  markets  in  the  1960s  and  earLy-L97  0s,  but  does  not  control
for  Reg Q effects  in  the  mid-1970s,  late-1970s,  and  early-1980s.  As  a  result,
the  reaL  rate  elasticity  forche  1960:Q1j1979:Q4  sanple  is  reduced  by
including  DCR,  and  at  the  same time,  the  real  rate  elasticity  for  the  longer
sanple  L960:QL-93:Q4  may be  upwardLy  biased  by  not  controlling  for  periods  of
dis intermediation  between  the  early-1970s  and  early-1980s.  Together,  both
effects  could  account  for  why  the  FRB nodel  yields  a  higher  real  rate
elasticity  using  the  longer  sarnple as  opposed  to  the  pre-1980  sample.
Consistedt  with  this  view,  when  the  FRB rnodel  is  estimated  without  DdR,  the
long-run  real  rate  elasticity  declines  by  188  in  size  as  the  end-of-sanple  is
extended  from  1979:Q4  to  L993:Q4  (table  3),  whereas  the  elasticity  rises  228
in  size  when  DCR is  included.
One major  problen  with  the  FRB model  is  that  as  samples  are  extended,
the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  lagged  real  rate  moves  a  good  deal  over  tirne.
This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2 which  plots  the  escinated  coefficient  on
log(R.'"-r)  frorn  the  FRB,  REGQSSC,  and  REGQMMC  models  using  samples  that  all
begin  in  1960:Q1  and  end  in  the  quarter  plotted  on  the  horizontal  axis.  For
example,  the  data  plotted  for  1979:Ql  are  estinated  coefficients  over  the
sample  period  1960:Q1-79:Ql.  As  is  evident  froro  Figure  2,  the  reaL  rate
coefficient  estinates  frorn  models  using  &EGQSS6 arrd REGQI'IMC  move  within  a  rnuch
narrower  tange  since  the  late-L97os  than  those  those  from  the  FRB model.
Ex  Post  Forecasts
The rnodels  in  table  l  were  used  to  forecast  1980:Q1-93:Q4,  1983:Ql--
93:Q4,  and  1988:Q1-93:Q4  using  in-sarnple  periods  beginning  in  1960:Ql  (table
















































































annualized  average  overpredictions  (.68*)  than  do  the  REGQSSc  (.41*)  and
REGQMI'IC  (.50t)  models  and  a  larger  surn of  squared  forecast  errors  (4.45E-4
versus  2.30E-4  and  2.948-4,  respectively).  However,  using  the  more  recent
forecast  period,  the  models  yield  sirnilar  S.S.E.'s  and  an  average  error  near
0.  These  findings  reflect  that  for  the  FRB model,  the  coefficients  of  the
Long-run  variables  (pernanent  incone,  housing  stock,  and  interest  rates)
change  greatly  as  samples  are  extended  from  the  late-1970s  to  the  early  1980s,
but  then  settle  down  at  levels  near  those  of  the  REGQSSC  ar.d REGQMMC  models.
Does  the  Advent  of  AP,]'Ig  Explain  the  EvoTution  of  Housing  Coefficients?
To  assess  whether  the  advent  of  ARMs explains  the  change  in  observed
interest  rate  elasuicities,  corresponding  models  were  estinated  that  replace
the  variable  Ro with  an  alternative  real  interest  rate  terrn  (R")  which,  in  its
construction,  replaces  the  nominal  rate  on  fixed  rate  mortgages  (R1)  with  a
weighted  average  of  effective  (initial)  rates  on  fixed-rate  and  adjustable-
rate  nortgages.  The  regression  results  provided  in  table  5  are  qualitatively
siroilar  to  resuLts  reported  in  table  1.  Tn  addition,  the  ARM share  of
mortgage  originations  was very  insignificant  when added  as  a  separate  r.h,s.
variable  to  the  nodels  in  tables  I  and  3.  While  adjusting  the  user  cost  of
housing  for  ARMs may be  important  for  explaining  the  stock  of  single-farnily
hornes,  it  is  plausible  that  the  advent  of  ARMs rnay affect  the  share  of  the
housing  scock  that  is  owner-occupied  without  noticeably  altering  the  aggregate
stock  of  residential  structures.  These  findings  suggest  that  changes  in
coefficients  for  the  aggregate  stock  of  housing  largely  reflect  the  passing  of
Reg  Q rather  than  the  advent  of  ARMs.1'
'- 
The  simple  adjustments  for  ARMs did  not
variables  to  diverge  that  nuch.  Furthermore,
cause  the  two  interest  rate
the  differences  in  the  rateIf,
VL  Conclusion
This  study  improwes upon previous  research  assessing  Reg Q's  effects  by
using  Reg Q measures which  account  for  new deposit  instruments  that  were
introduced  before  Reg Q ceilings  were  lifted.  Findings  indicate  that  rnodels
of  the  aggregate  housing  stock  are  unlikely  to  yield  rate  coefficients  that
are  suable  enough for  practical  use unless  they  accurately  control  for  deposit
regulation,  In  this  regard,  accounling  for  srnall  saver  or  money market
certificates  yieLds  significant  improvenents  over  a naive  Reg Q measure that
ignores  these  instruments,
Ttle evidence  is  mixed  on whether  the  intloduction  of  money market
certificates  was a more important  deregulatory  step  than  the  advent  of  small-
saver  certificates.  On the  one hand,  accounting  for  small  saver  certificates
appears to  result  in  slightly  less  wariable  estirnated housing  coefficients
than  does  controlling  for  money market  certificates.  On the  other  hand,
accounting  for  money narket  certificates  tends  to  yield  a  sonewhat better  in-
sample fit.
Nevertheless,  a naive  Reg Q ueasure  which  accounts  for  neither
innovation  does not  prevent  substantial  post-1979  movements in  coefficient
estimates  and is  clearly  inferior.  By providing  better  Reg Q measures, this
study  nay  help  analysts  better  gauge  aqgregate  housing  activity.  In  this
sense, aluhough Reg Q ended more than a decade ago,  it  is  still  with  us.
series  would  be  ewen  sxnaller  if  one  instead  modelled  the  interest  rate  on  ARMS
as  weighted  averaBe  of  the  initial  rate  and  expected  future  interest  rates.
There  are  two  reasons  for  this  result.  First,  the  expiration  of  initial  ARll
teaser  rates  implies  that  the  effective  rate  would  be  higher  than  the  initial
rate  under  a  flat  yield  curve.  Second,  the  yield  curve  Iras  upward  sloping
during  virtually  al1  of  the  period  \rhen  ARMS  were  allowed  nationally  (since
f98f).  Thus,  it  is  very  unLikely  that  using  a  rational  expectations  approach
to  modelling  ARM rates  -sould  affect  the  qualitative  results.IO
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Iog(HS)",,  lagged  stock
(A s  ince  79:4)
Iog(CON).,,,  perrnanent  income
(A since  79:4)
Iog(Rh)" r,  lagged  real  rate
(A since  79:4)
long-run  real  rate  elast.1
(A since  79:4)
Dis intermediation'?
(A since  79  :4)
R2
L9
Key Results  From FRB  l{odels
the  Dependent Variable  and  CoNTROL
REGQSSC  REGQSSC
-Modified  -Modified
FRB  Model  FRB  Model  FRB  Model  FRB  Model
60:L-93:4  6O:L-79:4  60:I-93:4  60:L-79:4
-0.35191  -0.21329  -0.35422  -0.31230
' (+428)  n.  a.  (-5t)  n.  a.
0.29922  0.22850  0.29534  0.26362
(+388)  n.  a.  (-9*)  n.  a.
-0.00576  -0.00540  -0.00601  -0.00620
(+898)  n.  a.  (+38)  n.a.
-0.01610  -o.0L916  -0.01698  -0.01985
(+328)  n.a.  (+108)  n.a.
-.002293  -.003s78  -.001403  -.0027t5
(-308)  n.a.  (-98)  n.a.




log(HS)",,  lagged  stock
(A since  79  :4)
1og(CON).-,,  permanent  income
(A since  79;4)
log(R").-,,  Iagged  real  rate
(A since  79  :4)
Iong-run  real  rate  eLast.l
(A since  79  :4)
Di s  intermediation?


























































I.  Long-run  real  interest  rate  elasticity
by  the  coefficient  on  Iog(HS)._r.
2.  DCR for  the  FRB rnodels,  one-quarter  lags
terms  for  regulation-modified  models.
None  of  the  models  include  CONTROL.
=  coefficient  on  1og(Rn).-. diwided









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  4:  Ex Post  ltous  lng  Forecast  Results
(A11 in-sample perlods  begln  ln  1950:Ql)
Average  Annual ized  Error
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(Not  Intended  for  Publicatton,  avallable  upon request  from  the  author,  )
Appendix  A:  Regression  Results  For  Housing  From Tno-Stage  Estinatlon
This  appendix  assesses  whether  regression  results  in  section  5  are
robust  to  using  two-stage  error-correction  models  which,  in  the  first  stage
estimate  cointegrating  relationships  to  define  error  correction  terms  used  in
a  second  stage  that  incfudes  short-run  dynamic  terns,  such  as  Reg  Q terms,
AL1 nodels  used  the  same error  correction  term  (ECFRB) from  a  first
stage  in  which  a  cointegrating  vector  containing  Iog(HS),  Iog(CON),  and Rh was
estimated  with  a  trend  following  Johansen's  and Juselius'  (1990).  In  the
second  stage,  the  models  contain  A(Rh),  Alog(HS)"_.,  and  Alog(HS)"_2,  and may or
may not  include  CONTROL.  The  roodels  wary  in  using  different  Reg  Q terms.
Each  Reg  Q variable  was  significant,  and  in  terms  of  R'!,  REGQMMC  perforned
best,  REGQSSC  and  DCR  performed  similarly,  and  REGQU  performed  the  least  well
(1960-93,  table  A1).  A  comparison  with  a  1960-79  sample  was  impossible
because  a  significant  cointegrating  vector  with  a  trend  rras  not  found.
However,  significant  cointegrating  vectors  vrere  found  aroong 1-og(HS),
log(CON),  and  Rh when  a  trend  was  not  included.  Over  L960-93,  the  REGQMMC
rnodel  had  the  best  fit,  follor,red  by  the  FRB model,  then  the  REGQSSC  model,  and
finally  the  REGQU  model  (table  A2).  For  rhe  L96O-19 sample  (table  A3),  FRB
and  REGQMMC  variants  hawe  similar  fits,  the  REGQSSC  rnodel  has  a  slightly  lower
R?,  and  the  REGQU  model  had  the  worst  fit  (table  A3).  However,  the  error
correction  coefficient  in  the  FRB nodel  rises  by  80t  in  size  while  that  of  DCR
falls  31-* in  size  vrhen the  sanple  is  extended  fron  79:Q4  to  93:Q4  (table  44).
The  respective  changes  are  +15*,  and  +2t  for  the  REGQSSC,  +5*  and  -239  for  the
RECQMMC,  and  +58  and  -70*  for  the  REGQU  nodels.  Like  table  2,  table  A4  shows
that  key  coefficients  are  more  stable  when  Reg  Q effects  are  properly  measured
and  that,  in  this  respect,  REGQSSC  and,  to  a  somer,rhat lesser  extent,  RECQMMC
outperforrn  the  FRB rnodel's  Reg  Q du|njlly (DCR)  and  a  naive  Reg  Q  term  (REGeU).24
Table  A1:  Two-Stage FRB Model Variants  (  1960-9  3  ) --Trend
Credit  Con-  REGQSSC  REGQMMC  REGQU
trol-Modified-Modified  -Modified  -Modified
Variables  FRB  Model  FRB  Model  FRB  Model  FRB  Model  FRB  Model
consranr  0.1645"  0.1532--  0.1630"  0.1909"  0.1441"
(6.80)  (6.66)  (7.01)  (7.77)  (5.ee)
ECFRB"_1  -0.0992"'  -O.0923"  -0.0982"  -0.1153"  -0.0864"
(-6.74)  (-6.60)  (-6.  e5)  (-7  .1L>  (-s.  e0)
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Table  A2:  Two-Stage  FRB Uodel  Varlants--No
(1960-93)
Credit  con-  REGQSSC
trol-Modif  ied-Modif  ied
FRB Model  FRB Model  FRB Model
-0.0006  -0.000s  -0.000s
(-0.  s+)  (-o.i2)  (-0.7s)
-0.0902"  -0.083s-'  -0.0878"

















-  (")  denotes  significant  at
n. a. --not  applicabLe  .
t-statistics  in  parentheses.
the  95S (99t)  level.t6
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t-statistics  in  parentheses.
the  95*  (998)  level.
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Table  A4:  Key  Estinated  Coefflclents  From  Tvo-Stage  FRB Uodel  Varlants
(  ETror-correction  terns  based  on  cointegrating  vectors  with  no  trend)
Credit  Con-
trol-Modified
FRB }4odel  FRB ModeL
Variables  60:1-93:  3  60:1-93:  3
error-correction  -0.090248  -O.083462
(A since 79:4)  (+80s)  (+66*)
Disintermediationl  -.002L54  -.002366
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-0  .07  7  323
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60:  L-79  :4
-0.073364
-.000885
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